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Abstract—A SCADA key management is required to provide
a key management protocol that will be used to secure the
communication channel of the SCADA entities. The SCADA key
management scheme often uses symmetric cryptography due to
resource constraints of the SCADA entities. Normally the use of
symmetric cryptography mechanism is in the form of pre-shared
keys, which are installed manually and are fixed. Then, these pre-
shared keys or long term keys are used to generate session keys.
However, it is important that these long term keys can be updated
and refreshed dynamically. With the nature of SCADA systems
which may consist of hundreds of nodes deployed in different
locations, manually updating and refreshing these long term keys
is time consuming. Thus, this paper proposes an automatic long
term key management method that updates and refreshes these
keys efficiently. The proposed method provides a flexibility to
refresh the long term keys and reduces the number of keys stored
in the SCADA entities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems that include a supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system have been widely used
in many industrial facilities for decades. Before the era of
the Internet, these SCADA systems operated in a closed
environment. Thus, there are no security features applied in
the SCADA systems, except the existence of physical access
controls. With the advances of the computing and networking
technologies, as well as the increase of the SCADA area usage,
many of these industrial facilities are moving their SCADA
systems to an open environment, which is connected to their
corporate and internet network.Especially with the commer-
cial availability of cloud computing, SCADA systems have
increasingly adopted Internet of things (IoT) technologies and
will continue to play an important role in Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT). Consequently, current SCADA systems face
new vulnerabilities from outsider adversaries.
The security of industrial control systems is facing real
threats. Several security attacks and incidents have happened
in the past few years. In June 2010, a computer worm
called Stuxnet caught the attention of many security experts,
it attacked and infected at least 14 industrial sites in Iran,
including a uranium-enrichment plant [1]. Another security
breach happened in 2011. According to the deputy assistant
director of FBI’s Cyber Division, the infrastructure of three
cities were accessed by hackers through the SCADA systems
[2]. In 2014, Dragonfly hacking group successfully looted
valuable information from multiple US and European energy
companies [3]. Hence, it is necessary to provide security
solutions to address these new security challenges.
A SCADA system generally consists of several entities
that are connected in a hierarchical structure. These entities
include a master terminal unit (MTU), several sub-master
terminal units (subMTUs), remote terminal units (RTUs), and
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The standard commu-
nication protocols that have been widely used in the SCADA
system normally do not provide any communication protec-
tion, for instance the Modbus and DNP3 protocols [4] [5].
Since SCADA systems are also used in critical infrastructures,
unprotected communication channels are easily vulnerable to
attacks. Hence, one of the security features that need to be
added to the SCADA systems is the implementation of secure
communications to provide authenticity, confidentiality and
integrity.
Secure communications are built based on cryptography
methods. One can use a symmetric cryptography, an asym-
metric cryptography or a combination of both symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography. Depending on the computing power
and resources of the RTUs, asymmetric cryptography, such
as public key cryptography, may not be suitable for the sys-
tem. However, using symmetric cryptography requires secure
key distribution methods. Normally the pre-shared keys are
installed manually before the system implementation. These
pre-shared keys are usually constants and fixed. However, it
is very important that these pre-shared keys can be updated
and refreshed. With the nature of a SCADA system that may
consist of several to hundreds of nodes in different locations,
manually updating these pre-shared keys is time consuming.
This paper proposes an automatic long term key man-
agement method that updates and refreshes these pre-shared
keys efficiently. The proposed method provides a flexibility to
refresh the long term keys and reduces the number of keys
stored in the SCADA entities. Although subMTUs and MTU
can have high computing power, it is still beneficial to reduce
the number of keys for management purposes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II,
we discuss the related work. Section III covers the SCADA
system we used and the proposed key management model. The
key management algorithms are explained in detail in Section
IV. Section V discusses the performance and security analysis
of the proposed method. Finally the conclusions and future
work are covered in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The first key management scheme for SCADA systems was
proposed back in 2002 by Sandia National Laboratories (SKE)
[6]. In the SKE method, the secure communication protocol
uses both symmetric and public key cryptography. In this
technique, the pre-shared keys are installed manually before
system implementation. In 2006, an AGA 12 team (American
Gas Association) published a secure communication standard
for SCADA systems [7]. However, this standard did not
include any key management scheme. Originally the AGA 12
would publish 4 different reports, but currently only two parts
are available. The 2nd AGA 12 standard was adopted by IEEE
as IEEE Standard 1711-2010, which published early 2011 [8].
In this standard, the pre-shared keys are installed manually in
each device. Then, the session key is generated using these
pre-shared keys. Nonetheless, this standard was withdrawn in
2014.
Researchers at Queensland University of Technology pro-
posed the SKMA method that improves the efficiency of the
SKE technique [9]. SKMA uses a modified ISO 11770-2
Mechanism 9 as its secure key protocol. Furthermore, SKMA
only uses symmetric cryptography techniques. The pre-shared
keys in this method are also installed manually. Assuming that
each entity in the SCADA system has its own unique pre-
shared key, the total number of the pre-shared keys stored
in each RTU, subMTUs and MTU are 1, r, and m(r+1)
respectively, where r is the number of RTUs in every subMTU,
and m is the number of subMTUs.
In 2009, ASKMA [10] and ASKMA+ [11] were proposed
to improve the efficiency of SKMA in terms of the number
of keys stored in a device and to address broadcast/multicast
issues. In ASKMA, the logical key structure is organized as a
binary tree/n-ary tree, while in ASKMA uses Iolus framework
and a binary tree. However, these protocols have fixed pre-
shared keys.
There have been other related work that uses asymmetric
cryptography instead of symmetric cryptography, for instance
the ID-based key management system (IKMS) [12], and the
LiSH key management system [13].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a SCADA system that consists of a MTU,
subMTUs and RTUs or PLCs as depicted in Figure 1 which
all entities have synchronized clocks. There are four types
of communication: MTU-subMTUs, subMTUs-RTUs, MTU-
RTUs, and RTUs-RTUS communications. Each entity in the
SCADA system has several unique IDs, where the subMTU
has a list of its RTU’s IDs, and the MTU has the list of
all entities’ IDs. The MTU and subMTUs have reasonable
computing power while RTUs have less computing power.
The main Key Distribution Center (KDC) in our system is
located at the MTU. In every subMTU there is a local KDC.
When the SCADA system is starting up, there is a sequence
of operations that needs to be performed. The first operation
Fig. 1. SCADA Structure
is the key distribution process between subMTUs and RTUs,
and between MTU and subMTUs. The second operation is the
KDC update from the subMTUs to the MTU so that the MTU
can communicate with all RTUs.
We assume that the MTU and subMTUs are located in the
secure areas which are protected through some physical and
logical access control. We modeled our SCADA system similar
to the SCADA system in a Metro Rail Architecture, where the
subMTUs are located in the Metro Rail Stations and the MTU
is located in the Operating Control Room (OCR). Thus, we
only consider adversaries that are able to compromise several
RTU nodes and try to access other uncompromised RTUs’
critical data.
The proposed method only considers the SCADA key
management, which requires pre-shared keys such as Long
Term Key (LTK) that are usually installed manually before
the system implementation. This paper only focuses on how
to generate, distribute, and update these LTKs efficiently. The
detail of the key management itself, for instance the session
key establishment and the broadcast key protocol, can use
other existing methods, such as SKMA, ASKMA/ASKMA+.
A. Key Management Model
Instead of using and installing a fixed LTK (Long Term
Key) in every RTU or subMTU before the system implemen-
tation, the proposed scheme installs a Setup-Key generation
program in each SCADA entity. The Setup-Key program
generates a setup key (Ksetup) dynamically based on the
device’s identifiers (RTU IDs / subMTU IDs), time, and the
previous LTK as shown in Figure 2. The setup key is used
to encrypt the new LTK that is generated by the KDCs. The
setup-key program has two variants: Setup-KeyRTU program
and Setup-KeyMTU program. The Setup-KeyRTU program is
only installed in RTUs while the Setup-KeyMTU program is
installed in all subMTUs and MTU. The difference between
these two programs is that in the Setup-KeyRTU program
the previous LTK value is stored in the device while the
Setup-KeyMTU program has two options in generating the
previous LTK value. The first option is for a device that acts
as a subordinate, in which the previous LTK value is already
available in the device, because the device stores its LTK. The
second option is for a device that acts as a controller. When
the device receives an incoming request for a new LTK from
its subordinate, it needs to generate the previous LTK value
of that subordinate dynamically, based on the data stored in
Fig. 2. Setup-Key Generation Code
Fig. 3. Device Initialization
its local KDC.
The device IDs can be the serial number of the device,
MAC address, or other types of device identifier. The serial
number of the device can be in the form of the CPU serial
number, board serial number, or hard disk serial number. How
to retrieve this serial number depends on the firmware pro-
vided by each device manufacturer. For instance, the RDREC
command can be used to retrieve the serial number of the
CPU in SIEMENS PLCs running on the firmware V2.0.x or
greater. Note that this serial number also needs to be given to
the system engineer of the company who wants to implement
the SCADA system with the proposed key distribution method.
The system engineer should be trusted and he is responsible
to keep the serial number from leaking to the public.
The time represents the time period when the commu-
nication is initiated. It can be in term of hour or every
several minutes. For instance when the communication starts
at 10:13:20am and the time is described as every 1 minute,
the communication time will be at 10:13am.
In the initial system setup the previous LTK of a device
is not available. Thus the Setup-Key generation program only
takes 2 inputs: the device IDs and time. Note that the initial
system setup is done in a safe environment by the trusted
system engineer as shown in Figure 3. After the Setup-Key
program is installed in the new device, the system engineer
connects to the appropriate KDC securely and stores the device
IDs. Then the new hardware is connected to the KDC so that
it can requests for LTK0. Such setup procedure is usually a
common practice in a company which a new hardware should
be initially setup and checked by the system administrator
before being used and operated. After the initial system setup,
the device can be installed on the actual device’s location.
To support the proposed key management method, the KDC
stores two tables: Master Key Table and Entity Table as shown
Fig. 4. Master Key and Entity Tables
in Figure 4. The Master Key table contains a list of Master
Keys. A Master Key is used as a seed for generating an LTK.
The Master Key for RTUs in subMTU is called KM−SM while
the Master Key for subMTUs in MTU is called KM−MTU .
Note that each subMTU has its own KM−SM . The MTU has
all of the latest KM−SM of its subMTUs. Thus, the number
of Master Keys stored in each subMTU and MTU are 1 + p
and 1 + p + m respectively, where p is the duration how long
a device can be offline and m is the number of subMTUs. The
Entity table contains the IDs, Login and Version parameters of
its subordinates. The Login parameter identifies which Master
Key is currently used by a particular SCADA entity. The
Version indicates the latest LTK version currently used in that
entity.
A Master Key is used in single operation duration. Op-
eration duration starts when a new Master Key is generated
and ends when this Master Key is replaced by another new
Master Key. These Master Keys can be renewed whenever
the SCADA system restarts or at any particular time using a
specific command. When a Master Key is renewed while the
system is in operation, all LTKs that were generated from the
previous Master Key should be updated accordingly. If the
updated Master Key is KM−SM , the new KM−SM should be
passed to the MTU.
B. Long Term Key Distribution and Update Processes
The complete long term key distribution process is shown
in Figure 5. When the SCADA system starts up every entity
except MTU requests for a new LTK, LTKN where N ≥ 1,
to its controller. This request is encrypted by the individual
Ksetup. Every RTU and subMTU generates its Ksetup based
on its IDs, the time period when the request is initiated, and
its previous LTK, LTKN−1. When the controller receives this
request, it needs to retrieve the data belongs to the subordinate
(RTU or subMTU) indicated by the source IP address from
the local KDC: IDs, Login, and Version. Then the controller
can generate the previous LTK of the subordinate based on the
Master KeyLogin, IDs, and Version. Finally the Ksetup of that
subordinate can be generated. After decrypting the incoming
request, the controller validates the request. If the request
contains the correct IDs of the subordinate then LTKN can be
generated from the controller’s latest Master Key. The LTKN
is sent back to the subordinate. It decrypts the LTKN package,
retrieves the LTKN and stores it. Finally the subordinate sends
a confirmation message to the controller that the LTKN is
Fig. 5. LTK Distribution
Fig. 6. Key Update Establishment
successfully received and stored. Then the controller updates
the Login and Version fields in its local KDC. When every
entity in the SCADA system has received its LTK, every
subMTU can send its current Master Key, Login and Version
fields to the MTU.
The LTK update process is performed according Figure 6.
When a new Master Key KM−SM is generated in a subMTU,
the subMTU generates a list of new LTKs for its subordinates
based on this new KM−SM . Then the subMTU sends each
of these LTKs to the appropriate subordinate encrypted by
the previous LTK. After receiving the LTK update, each
subordinate sends a confirmation message encrypted by the
new LTK. Then the subMTU can store the new KM−SM in the
Master Key table in FIFO order and sends the new KM−SM
to the MTU. The LTK update process can also be performed
without renewing the Master Key. In this case, the LTK is
renewed based on the value of Version field in the Entity
Table. The subMTU can increase the Version values in order
to update the LTK of its subordinates. The difference of these
LTK update processes is that in the case of renewed Master
Key, the LTKs of all subordinates should be updated while
in the case of increased Version field, only the subordinates
whose the Version fields got renewed that need to be updated.
IV. KEY MANAGEMENT ALGORITHM
The algorithms of the setup-key generation programs are
shown in Figure 7 and in Figure 8. Figure 7 is the algorithm
for Setup-KeyRTU program which is only installed in RTUs.
Setup-KeyRTU Algorithm
begin
1. time = get the current time
2. ids = get the device id
3. if LTKdevice exists then
3.1. return hash(ids + time + LTKdevice)
4. else
4.1. return hash(ids + time)
end
Fig. 7. Setup-KeyRTU Program
Figure 8 is the algorithm for Setup-KeyMTU program which
is installed in every subMTU and MTU.
The Login and Version fields in the Entity Table are used
for the LTK generation. In the beginning, the Login field and
the Version field of all entities are set to -1 and 0. These values
represents that all entities are new devices that have not been
initially set up. In the initial stage, all KDCs should have at
least 1 Master Key.
The Login field indicates which Master Key is used to
calculate the Ksetup of a subordinate dynamically while the
Version field is used to multiply the hash function in generating
the LTK. The complete algorithm of the LTK generation code
is shown in Figure 9. The MK[] contains the list of Master
Keys which index 0 points to the latest confirmed Master Key.
Index p shows the oldest Master Key that the controller still
maintains. For instance, if an RTU has been offline longer
than the period permitted such that the Master Key used in
its LTK is already discarded by the subMTU, the RTU will
not be able to connect the subMTU. Consequently, the system
operator will be alarmed due to the failure in accepting a new
LTK request from that RTU. This RTU can work normally
if it is reconfigured again as a new device and its entry in
the Entity Table is reset by the trusted system engineer. If an
RTU is successful in requesting a new LTK from its subMTU,
then the RTU is considered as ”logged in” and its entry in the
Entity Table is updated. Every time a device logs in to its
controller, its entry in the Entity Table is updated as follows:
• The Login Field is set to 0
• If the new LTK is produced by a new Master Key then
the Version field is set to 1
• If the new LTK is produced by the existing Master Key
then the Version field is set to Version + 1
When a new Master Key is generated in a subMTU, all
LTKs of the logged-in subordinates need to be updated. When
it has confirmed that these LTKs have been updated, this
Master Key will be stored at index 0 in the Master Key List.
Then the previous Master Keys will be shifted to the right.
Consequently the oldest Master Key is discarded. All Login
fields of the logged-in subordinates will be set to 0, while the
login fields of the offline subordinates will be increment by 1.
This new Master Key along with the IDs of the updated RTUs
are sent to the MTU. The key distribution and update process
for MTU-SubMTU are performed similarly.
Setup-KeyMTU Algorithm
begin
1. time = get the current time
2. if the device acts as a subordinate then
2.1. ids = get the device id
2.2. if LTKdevice exists then
2.2.1. return hash(ids + time + LTKdevice)
2.3. else
2.3.1. return hash(ids + time)
3. else
3.1. IP = retrive the source IP address
3.2. if deviceIP has previously logged in
3.2.1. params = get the entry of deviceIP in
the Entity Table
3.2.2. ltk = generate LTK based on params
3.2.3. return hash(ids + time + ltk)
3.3. else
3.3.1. return hash(ids + time)
end
end
Fig. 8. Setup-KeyMTU Program
LTK Generation Algorithm(ids, MK[], req, version):
begin
1. seed = RS[req]
2. for i = 2 to version do
2.1. seed = hash(seed)
3. return hash(seed + ids)
end
Fig. 9. LTK Generation Algorithm in controller sides (subMTUs, MTU)
V. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we give detailed security and performance
analysis of the proposed method. The proposed method pro-
vides efficiency and flexibility of the key distribution pro-
cedure without sacrificing security level and incurs small
performance overhead.
Theorem 1: The proposed method has the same security
level as the manual pre-shared keys method.
Proof: (1) The difference between the manual pre-shared
key and the proposed method is that in the manual pre-shared
key, the LTKs shared between the RTUs and MTU/ subMTUs
need to be installed in the RTU and MTU/ subMTUs before
the system implementation, while in the proposed method,
we install the setup-key generation program. In the manual
pre-shared key method, the pre-shared key must be stored
securely both in the RTUs and MTU/subMTUs, for instance
by encrypting it. Similarly, the setup-key generation code in
our scheme is also protected. The protections can be through
code obfuscation, code encryption, or using a secure hardware
token.
(2) In the manual pre-shared keys scheme, compromising
an RTU will not make other RTUs vulnerable because their
pre-shared keys are unknown. Similarly, in our approach,
compromising an RTU does not make other RTUs vulnerable
as well. When an RTU is compromised, adversaries will have
the setup-key generation code, and the previous LTK of the
compromised RTU. Based on these two properties, they are
not able to deduce and predict LTKs of other uncompromised
RTUs. They need to have access to the KM−SM , LTK gen-
eration program, and other RTUs’ IDs, Login and Version
parameters.
Theorem 2: The proposed method provides authentication
mechanism and simplifies the key management operations.
Proof: (1) The initial setup in the proposed method is
performed in a safe environment. Together with the device’s
IDs and the safe environment, the authentication of a device
can be guaranteed. (1) When an RTU starts up, it needs to
request for a new LTK to its subMTU based on its identifiers
and the previous LTK value. This request can be considered
as a login process. If this RTU is requesting from a different
location, the subMTU will not accept the request unless the
local KDC is updated accordingly. Similarly, when a different
RTU is placed on the existing location, the subMTU will
not accept the request. Thus it provides an authentication
capability based on the location and the hardware dynamically.
(2) In the manual pre-shared keys method, the pre-shared
keys are fixed. There is no mechanism to modify these pre-
shared keys at the RTU sides, unless the modification is done
manually. In the proposed method, the LTKs can be easily
updated from the subMTUs or the MTU. This simplifies the
key management operations.
(3) When an RTU is offline and not in operation longer than
the time permitted, the subMTU will not be able to create
the same Ksetup as the one created by the RTU. Since the
identifiers and the login histories of this RTU are stored in the
local KDC, the subMTU/MTU can alert the system operators
about the failure of the login request. Thus an appropriate
action can be taken by the system operator or engineer.
Theorem 3: The proposed method incurs small perfor-
mance and size overhead.
Proof: The performance of the setup-key generation code
does not affect the system performance in general since it is
only executed once at the system start up before the normal
operation starts. When a node needs to communicate with
another node, it needs a session key. This session key is usually
valid for a period of time. The generation of the session
key may depend on the value of the LTK, for instance in
the SKMA method. Since the RTUs store their LTKs, the
generation of a session key can be performed normally. On
the other hand, a subMTU/MTU needs to run LTK generation
code to generate a session key. Since the subMTU/MTU has
reasonable computing power, it will not affect the commu-
nication performance. The comparison between the proposed
method and the manual pre-shared keys method in term of
number of keys stored in a device is shown in table I.
Table II represents the size and performance overheads
of the proposed method. The simulations are performed as
follows:
TABLE I
NUMBER OF KEYS TO BE STORED IN A DEVICE
Node SKE SKMA *ASKMA+ Ours
MTU m(1+r) m(1+r) mr 2+p+m
subMTU 1+r 1+r r 2+p
RTU 1 1 1 1
(*)without considering the group keys [14]
TABLE II
SIZE AND PERFORMANCE OVERHEADS OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
Node Size *Setup-Key Generation *LTK Generation
MTU 12 Kbytes <400usec(subordinate);
<200usec(controller)
<50usec
subMTU 12 Kbytes <400usec(subordinate);
<200usec(controller)
<50usec
RTU 35 Kbytes 0 -
(*)without considering database accesses and LTKver = 10
• subMTUs and MTU: It is based on VMWare Player run-
ning Ubuntu 12.04.05 with the host computer running on
Windows 7. The Ubuntu is configured to have 4GB RAM
and 4 processors. The host computer has 8GB RAM and
Intel Xeon Processor @3.00 Hz. The applications are
written in C and compiled using gcc.
• RTUs: It is simulated on Vxworks 5.5 and Tornado 2.2
running on Windows XP 32 bits. The Windows XP is
configured to have 4GB RAM and 4 processors as Virtual
Machine. The simulation Vxsim uses PowerPC processor.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we develop an automatic long term key
management method for SCADA systems that provides better
efficiency and flexibility on the distribution of the long term
keys. The proposed method allows the updating and refreshing
of the long term keys at run time and reduces the number of
keys stored in the subMTUs and the MTU without sacrificing
the security and performance in general. Furthermore, the
solution helps the system operators to manage and to detect
abnormalaties in the deployed RTUs.
In future work, we will improve the current solution to
address the possibility of any compromised subMTUs in the
system by introducing a diversified LTK generation code. We
will also look into how to detect compromised RTUs so that
the solution can prevent and stop the communication between
the subMTU/MTU and the compromised RTUs.
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